1On March 12th and March 14th, the Unit 2 and 4 containment structures - one of those 'boxes' -
at Fukushima Daiichi, respectively, blew up, and we were told that these were caused by
a build-up of 'hydrogen' gas. Some of that smoke was debris from the shattered concrete walls, etc...
2WSJ article: 'Low Levels of Radioactive Material Begin to Be Detected Across Pacific'
3 Michio Ishikawa of the Japan Nuclear Technology Institute conjectured in his appearance
on Asahi TV on April 29, 2011 that the molten core rose above 2,000 degrees Celsius.
In an article
that appeared on September 23, 2011 in the Asahi Weekly that was translated into
a stub article on Enenews.com [Takashi: Plutonium evaporated and spread around as gas after Fukushima meltdowns],
journalist Hirose Takashi says the reactor cores reached 4000 degrees Celsisus, which
led to the vaporization of plutonium.
4 Fresh fuel rods are 100% uranium isotopes and non-fresh ones have some 'fission products' - more
5 Because the corium or lava-like fuel rod slag at the basement (or beyond the basement) of
one or more reactors at Fukushima is likely still several thousand degrees Celsius, volatilization
of many elements is still occurring and will do so for years or even decades.
6 Firstly, we need to clarify that spent fuel has plutonium 239 (and other isotopes) in it but Unit 3's
fuel had MOX or a plutonium oxide mix that has a slightly lower boiling
point than plutonium-239. There was some speculation on physics forums on the web
that another mechanism of dispersal from the melting cores, other than volatilization, was plutonium and uranium
oxides rising with steam. The thinking is that they are more soluble than the non-oxide versions and would
vaporize with H20 (water) molecules.
7 After the containment
buildings were compromised, volatilized isotopes at Fukushima
would permeate the corium (a lava-like slag with a permeable crust) and rise (due to
to buoyancy and hot air currents) through
holes and cracks in the reactor pressure and containment vessels into the outside
air. Then, they 'precipiate' back into solids when cooled and attach to microscopic dust particles, becoming
vulnerable to wind and air currents. Months and years after the meltdowns,
the same thing is happening; the only difference is the corium, months and years later, is not as hot as it once was, it might
be in different configurations or pieces, and it is partially or fully submerged in water. Nonetheless,
the corium will remain hot enough - and not contained enough (even by water) - for years or decades
such that vapor forms of radioactive cesium and plutonium (and other nuclides) will constantly escape.
Note that the entire inventory of noble gases (including
radiokryptons, radioargons, and radioxenons) and tritium and carbon-14 fully escaped from the stricken reactors
at Fukushima by around April 2011.
8 Journal article titled 'The Japanese Tsunami and Resulting
Nuclear Emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Facility: Technical, Radiologic,
and Response Perspectives,' September 2011. Read the abstract.
Another good passage is this: "In fuel melt, there is a significant amount of
barium (140Ba) and strontium (89Sr, 90Sr), as well as other
radioactive elements, including ruthenium, lanthanum, yttrium,
neptunium, and molybdenum. Although radioactive products
such as these were seen in weapons testing fallout (because
they were created in a near-instantaneous large fission and
were immediately available for release), in a nuclear reactor
they are trapped in the fuel rods and are released in significant
quantities only when the fuel melts. Also in reactor
accidents, fission product releases can undergo other removal
mechanisms such as deposition in the reactor pressure vessel,
the primary containment, or filtration. The specific pathway
to the environment will determine such reductions."
9 The CTBTO station at Takasaki registered over a 24 hour period on March 15-16 about
27 becquerels per cubic meter for tellurium-132, which was the highest level for any isotope detected in
the station's sampling through March 20th.
10 On a daily blog he maintained during the early part of the nuclear disaster, Dr. Saji commented:
"TEPCO's sampling data did not contain Sr-89 and Sr-90 in the contaminated water. Although, the Government
instructed to fortify environmental monitoring of sea water, the Sr-89 and Sr-90 data have not been shown.
These two species are essential for investigation of natural food chains of marine products."
Dr. Saji was speaking in context of
strontium 89 and 90 (two of the most common radioactive isotopes of strontium) leaking into the ocean
from the 'cooling' operations by TEPCO (and the danger posed to marine life and nuclear workers.
He also noted on a daily commentary on April 7th following news that three TEPCO workers'
feet were burned by a radiation source in standing water, that
"It is very strange that the radiation concentration data by TEPCO continue to ignore presence of Sr-89 and
Sr-90 in spite of the...injuries..." - also - "Considering the beta-ray burn incident of the three
electricians irradiated in the skin of their feet, it is obvious that these radioactive species should be
included in the contaminated water. It is likely the radiation injury was though [sic] Sr-89, considering its
high concentrations."
Dr. Saji also provided estimates of the inventory of
radiostrontiums that could be released (by volatilization, explosion, etc...) from the reactors into air, land
and water in the worst-case scenario - if the reactors basically blew up. See next footnote for info on that.
11Dr. Saji calculated that the accidental source term (the inventory at shut down, which could
be released if all the reactors blew up) for Fukushima Daiichi units 2-5 is 2,649 PBq for strontium-89
and 171 PBq for strontium-90. (What is PBq? It is 1.0 x 1015).
In Dr. Saji's analysis, units 1-4 are referred to as units 2-5, and, to add to the confusion,
unit 4 (his unit 5) had zero fuel rods in the core. So, the worst case source term mentioned for Sr-90 was really
for units 1-3 blowing up their full contents. The strontium-90 source term is about 1/4 of the total
strontium-90 released from all global atmospheric nuclear testing.
12 'Radioactive strontium detected outside 30km zone - NHK World.' The science
ministry 3.3 to 32 becquerels of strontium 90 per kilogram of soil in samples taken from 3 locations in Namie
Town and Iitate Village, 30 kilometers from the plant.
.13 In December 2011, the United States Department of Energy released data it collected in various
locations in Japan, including the roof of an embassy, that contained values of strontium-89 and 90.
Also, TEPCO admitted in early May 2011 that it had found radiostrontium several hundred meters from its reactors at Fukushima. 14 Idealist.ws. 'Strontium-89 and Strontium-90 pose an extraordinary threat to Japan - So, What is the Silver Lining?,' by
Andrew Kishner
15 'Radionuclides from the Fukushima accident in the air over Lithuania:
measurement and modelling approaches,' Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 2012
16 The book by Jay Gould ('The Enemy Within') contains an interesting passage
to reflect on possible 'tampering' by EPA: 'Oddly enough, in 1982 there were some months in which many cities
were reported to have large negative concentrations of radionuclides in milk, which can have no physical
meaning. It is possible to have slight negative readings because of statistical uncertainty in measuring
milk with zero levels of radioactivity, but it is not possible for such uncertainty to reach levels of greater
than -5 picocuries per liter.'(Four Walls Eight Windows, 1996, p. 57, more on pp. 58-60).
To be able to make conclusions on EPA's data, we would need to
have the EPA's full data that was printed from their instruments - this includes
blanks and QC samples. Only using such information - all obtainable from EPA - as the detection limit(s), raw
instrument data and 'blank biases' (a blank should always be zero and any positive or negative value will bias
the analysis) will we be able to trust the data. Here's the summary of EPA's data
(EPA pu238 data in excel format. Note: we chose to focus on EPA's
plutonium-238 data although there was equally questionable - negative - data
from that agency for plutonium-239.) Same applies.
17"'Moscow' detects radioactive particles"
18 'LIMITED TESTING OF MILK FOR RADIOACTIVE STRONTIUM PROMPTS NEW CONCERNS'
19 In late October 2011 an annual report (original report link) from an environmental agency of the State of Kansas was
released, and in it were some surprising results. A milk sample from 'Sunrise Dairy,' a pasture-fed dairy farm in Coffee County, Kansas, which was
collected and tested by a division of the state's Department of Health and Environment, contained 1,518 picocuries (pCi) of iodine-131 per liter.
The measurement was taken in a rural region of Kansas nearby Wolf Creek nuclear power plant. The state agency asserted that the elevated levels of
radioactive iodine they found in milk (and also soil and air) during that month were unequivocally attributable to Fukushima and not the local reactor.
The anomalous lab result in the end was determined to be the result of human error following an email inquiry by
this author to the state agency. The actual value was 4 pCi/L (not 1,518). (The state agency didn't even test for other radioisotopes in Sunrise
Dairy milk that may pose an even greater threat to public safety than cesium-137 or iodine-131.
The failure of the State of Kansas to test
milk, soil or air around the Wolf Creek reactor for more dangerous isotopes like strontium-90 or plutonium conflicts
with the end-purpose of the surveillance program which is to use environmental
radiation data 'to determine the need for corrective and/or protective actions to protect the health and safety of the public.')
It is astonishing to this author that the elevated iodine-131 value didn't raise
alarm bells when it was released (in late 2011) in public health agencies in Kansas' government or elsewhere. The value of 1,518 pCi/L of
iodine-131 value in "Sunrise Dairy" milk from April 2011 would be about one-third of the FDA Derived Intervention Level for Iodine-131 of 4,770
picocuries per liter. If a value 1/3 of the DIL was found on a one-off sample, wouldn't anyone be concerned that there could be higher values?
Non-credible data: Elevated radiation values in U.S. foodstuffs were determined by the BRAWN team at Berkeley in 2011 (and 2012) but
this author feels that the nuclear physics students and staff there have zero competence in their laboratory tasks
and their data is not credible.
20 CTBTO data released in 2012 indicated that
the peak detection of xenon-133 of all (that is, all of 10) CTBT monitoring stations with 'Noble Gas systems' post-Fukushima
in the U.S. occurred at (USX74) Ashland, Kansas, where
13,453 mBq/m3 or 13.453 Bq/m3 of xenon-133 gas was detected on March 23, 2011.
The data was presented in
'Operational Impacts of the Fukushima Nuclear Event on Radionuclide Monitoring
of United States IMS Stations,' Carty et. al, 2011. The highest
such value post-Chernobyl in the U.S. was 20 Bq/m3 and about 100 Bq/m3 downwind (375 km) of TMI.
21Per section II of the FDA paper 'Supporting Document for Guidance Levels for Radionuclides in Domestic and Imported Foods
[Docket No. 2003D-0558]: "The calculation of guidance levels for radionuclide activity concentration in food depends in part on
Protective Action Guides (PAGs). PAGs are radiation dose levels to an individual at which protective action should be considered to limit the
radiation dose to that individual... The 1982 FDA guidance document established two levels for PAGs. The lower level, called the Preventative PAG,
was a projected dose commitment of 5 mSv to the whole body, active bone marrow, or any other organ except the thyroid, or a projected dose commitment
of 15 mSv to the thyroid. The upper level, called the Emergency PAG, was a projected dose commitment of 50 mSv to the whole body, active bone marrow, or
any other organ except the thyroid, or a projected dose commitment
of 150 mSv to the thyroid....The 1998 FDA document replaced the Preventative and Emergency PAGs with one set of PAGs for the ingestion
pathway. The PAGs established in the 1998 FDA document are 5 mSv for committed effective dose equivalent or 50 mSv committed dose equivalent to
an individual tissue or organ, whichever is more limiting (i.e., the most limiting PAG results in the lowest level of radionuclide activity concentration
in food). For 5 mSv committed effective dose equivalent (the PAG adopted in the new CPG), the associated lifetime total cancer mortality would be
2.25 x 10-4 or approximately 1 in 4400. For comparison, the estimate of the normal lifetime total cancer mortality in the United States for the general
population, not associated with additional radiation dose from ingestion of food contaminated with radionuclides, is 0.19 or approximately
1 in 5 (CIRRPC 1992). Thus, in a general population of 10,000 individuals, the number of cancer deaths over the lifetime of the individuals would
be 1990; if each received a committed effective dose equivalent of 5 mSv, the number of cancer deaths over the lifetime of the individuals could
increase in theory by about 2, for a total of 1992 cancer deaths."
It is important to note that the lifetime cancer mortality formula used by
the FDA is conservative and unrealistic. In the book titled 'Radiation-Induced
Cancer from Low-Dose Radiation: An Independent Analysis,' the late radiobio
logist John Gofman concluded, based on his own independent research on atom bomb
survivor and casualty data, that the incidence rate (or 'yield') of extra cancer fatalities resulting from 1 million person-Rems of radiation exposure is
2,600 when applied to low-dose whole body organ exposures, acute or slow, at between zero and five Rems. How does this relate to
the FDA's limits? The FDA says that 5 mSv (milliSievert), which is 0.5 Rem, would increase a person's cancer mortality risk by 0.000225 (percent)
in a 10,000 person population - this is the same as saying 2.25 fatal cancers are expected.
Gofman argued that a 1 Rem dose across 1 million persons yields 2,600 fatal cancers. Another way to state it:
a 0.5 Rem dose across 1 million persons yields 1,300 fatal cancers. Gofman would predict 13 fatal cancers in this 10,000
person population or a 0.0013 fatal cancer risk is 0.0013 (percent), which is 6 times greater than what the FDA is saying.
The FDA also
doesn't consider that some, or many, of the 19 in 100 (more like 30 or 40 in 100) people in America who will contract fatal cancer
in their lifetimes might be victims of radiation-induced cancer. This means that many Americans bodies' are suffering from cumulative radiation
contamination (of the thyroid, bone etc...) and their immune systems are already starting to break down. The FDA needs to think that additional input
of radiation from 'Sunrise Dairy' milk, or another tainted product, might do far more damage than just increasing cancer mortality risk by a slim number - it
could turn a pre-condition into a full-fledged condition.
Also, as it relates to iodine-131,
the FDA fails to account for the non-fatal thyroid cancers (most thyroid cancers are non-fatal) that could result from mass radioiodine poisoning.
22 Note that
inhaling just 1.176 nanograms of airborne plutonium-238 gives an internal dose of 5 Rems, or 50 times
your yearly dose from background radiation. Note that strontium-90 pools into the teeth and bones of
animals, including humans, and children and infants are especially vulnerable.
Note: Read more about thyroid exposures from NTS fallout in: "Draft: A Perspective on Public Concerns about Exposure to Fallout from the Production and Testing of Nuclear Weapons," presented at
the 2001 Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements by authors F. Owen Hoffman, Ph.D., A. Iulian Apostoaei, Ph.D. and Brian A. Thomas, M.S.
Also, a paper published in 2006 ['Thyroid Disease Associated With Exposure to the Nevada Nuclear Weapons Test Site Radiation: A Reevaluation Based on Corrected
Dosimetry and Examination Data,' Joseph L. Lyon, Et. Al., Epidemiology, Volume 17, Number 6, November 2006] examined the risk for thyroiditis, the most common form
of thyroid disease in the U.S., among persons who were exposed to radioactive isotopes from Nevada bomb
test fallout in the 1950s and 1960s The scientific group leader, Joseph Lyon, had previously published his results in 1993 but was criticized
for 'examiner bias.' The follow-up study (in 2006) was 'the first report of such a relationship in a U.S. population,' examining thyroiditis and
exposure to radioactive iodine. The study's calculated ERR values for
thyroiditis are as follows: >0 to 74 milliGrays =1.0; 75 to 215 milliGrays = 1.6; 216 to 409 milliGrays = 1.9; and 410 milliGrays and above = 5.6.
The ERR - or excess risk ratio - is sometimes called Excess Cancer Risk or Excess Lifetime
Risk.
Note(2): An article in the publication
Superfund Report on May 2, 2011 highlights the crisis of confidence in the U.S.
government over FDA standards:
"...EPA Superfund officials have in the past rejected use of FDA's guidelines as adequate protection against
cancer risk, according to documents obtained by Inside EPA under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).
According to the FOIA documents, the Superfund officials believe
the DILs "allow the public to ingest food [contaminated] at concentrations 200 times greater than EPA's guidance for drinking water during
emergency" actions under Superfund (Superfund Report, April 18)."
Note(3): NRC NUREG (regulatory guide) 1.109 published data that
indicates adults are the most sensitive
to cesium-137 in food (whole body, 7.14E-05 mRem/pci) and also cesium-134 in food (whole body, 1.21E-04 mRem/pci). ICRP
provides 1.50E-08 Bq/Sv for cs-137 or 4.5E-02 pCi/mRem. For iodine-131 effects
on whole body and thyroid, however, infants are most vulnerable (whole body, 1.86E-05 mRem/pci; thyroid, 1.39E-02). This author
wholeheartedly disagrees with most of the dose coefficients out there, and especially for strontium-89 and -90 for reasons
he discusses in the footnotes of chapter 3.
